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On Medium Specificity And 
Discipline Crossovers In Modern Art
Jacques Rancière interviewed by Andrew McNamara and Toni Ross 
McNamara and Ross: In a recent interview in Artforum, you draw an analogy 
between the interdisciplinary nature of contemporary art and the nature of 
your own work.1 This interests us because the question of the medium or 
intermediality is the focus of this issue of the Journal Of Art. Can you explain 
what is at stake in your approach to interdisciplinarity?
RANCIÈRE: I would describe my attitude as a-disciplinarity or in-disciplinarity 
rather than interdisciplinary. The stake of this attitude is clearly a political one. A 
discipline is much more than the study of a field of objects and questions. It is the 
delineation of a territory, which means a double operation of exclusion. First of all, 
the distribution of disciplines means the exclusion of those who have not the specific 
competence for exploring a territory. But what distinguishes the philosophical 
competence from the historical competence or the sociological competence, etc? It is 
always a matter of the specialist using his or her brain to study some facts and try 
to make sense of them. And what distinguishes, for instance, a philosophical object 
from a sociological object? A building, a performance or a discourse are each a form 
of occupation that concern space or usages of time. They are forms of distribution 
of the visible and the thinkable. The birth of the museum, of mise-en-scene or 
installation art each reframe the common landscape of the visible, the thinkable 
and the feasible. These forms of reframing don’t belong to any specific discipline. 
On the contrary, you have to step out of the disciplinary frames to understand how 
they redistribute the relations between spaces and times, between forms of activity, 
spheres of life and modes of discourse. The allegation of the specificity of the 
territory abandons this possibility of understanding what is at stake in favour of a 
self-consciousness of competence: the attribution of disciplinary competences is the 
way of tracing the line between those who are able and those who are unable. 
This brings me to the second aspect of the process of exclusion: the outer 
separation is the other face of an inner separation. The territory of the discipline is 
structured by the opposition between two kinds of beings: those who are objects 
of knowledge and those who are subjects of knowledge. The position of the 
scientific historian or sociologist gives them another kind of thought than that of the 
thinking beings who are their ‘objects’ and whose thought is considered merely the 
‘expression’ of a totality that they are unable to grasp. What I try to oppose to that 
distribution of competences is what I called a ‘method of equality’, which makes 
the opposite presupposition that there are not two kinds of distinct intelligence. 
The descriptions and arguments of social science are manifestations of the same 
Jason Rhoades The Creation Myth 1998 (detail), mixed media; courtesy Estate of Jason Rhoades, Galerie Hauser and Wirth, 
London and Zurich; David Zwirner, New York.
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intelligence as that which is at work in the thought and practice of those who 
are their ‘objects’. They both depend on what I called a poetic of knowledge that 
oversteps the divisions of disciplines.
You also mention the prevalence of ‘multimediality’ in contemporary art. Why do 
you believe the emergence of such hybrid forms is important? What possibilities 
do such forms hold in your opinion?
The belief is not mine. Hybridity was celebrated in so-called ‘postmodern’ discourse 
as the collapse of the modernist tradition of separation between high art and 
popular art, or it was taken as evidence of new forms of life and art linked to new 
technologies. Conversely, modernists saw in hybridity the collapse of art with the 
commodity or entertainment. I only tried to reinscribe such practices in the history 
of the ‘aesthetic regime of art’.2 Modern and postmodern writers endorse the same 
view of modernity as the emancipation of each art, its commitment to its own 
medium, a commitment that they trace back to Lessing’s ‘Laocoon’. This is why 
they put the emphasis on the ‘rupture’ produced by multimedia art. But this view 
is misleading. The aesthetic revolution, as I have defined it, first means that the 
former equation of the artwork with a specific place and destination was replaced 
by the idea of the framing of a specific sensorium or a specific sphere of experience. 
This specific sensorium can be the museum – viewed as the ‘remote’ place where 
art works are disconnected from their social or religious destination – yet it can 
also be understood as the sensorium created by artistic practices that overstep the 
separation between senses and media. Mallarmé’s project was not so much about 
the ‘autonomy’ of poetry as it was about inventing a spatial language of poetry, 
the model of which was the language of the feet in dance. Modern dance itself was 
an attempt at defining a new form of theatrical performance whose forms were 
borrowed from antique painting and sculpture. From the outset modernism created 
forms of performance, which connected the plastic arts, music, theatre, design, 
‘mimique’, cinema, sport and so on.3 The idea of modernism as ‘autonomy’ or ‘truth 
to medium’ is a very late one. And it was a certain reversal of historical modernism, 
which was clearly about the crossing of borders between the different arts and 
between art and life. So I don’t overstate the importance of hybrid forms. I only try 
to say that they must be viewed in the frame of a more comprehensive history where 
the crossings, shifts and displacements between media have always been crucial.
In the Artforum interview you say that artistic multimediality should not be 
confused with the ‘great multimedia spectacle’. In addition, your essay ‘The 
Emancipated Spectator’ discriminates between different kinds of hybridity 
in contemporary art. You are critical of revivals of the Gesamtkunstwerk, as 
well as hybridised practices that inflate ‘the power of the performance without 
questioning its grounds’.4 This suggests you don’t regard multimedia or relational 
art as automatically subversive or even interesting. Could you clarify, perhaps 
with some examples, why you have doubts about these particular varieties of 
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artistic or cultural hybridity?
‘Multimediality’ only means that you combine several media. The combination 
may be implemented in various ways, with various intentions and effects. The 
combination may be an addition or it may be a fusion. The addition may produce a 
surplus of sensory power or it can create a lack, a gap or a distance. Multimediality 
has often been used by conceptual artists to explore the relations between words, 
meanings and visible forms. When Gary Hill used a number of monitors as 
sculptural elements to explore the relations between a mouth and the words that 
go through it, this could hardly be considered as ‘hyper-spectacle’. Yet, in contrast, 
when Jason Rhoades built his gigantesque installation The Creation Myth (1998), 
that was supposed to represent the bellows of the capitalist machine swallowing 
everything and turning it to shit, he may have had the intention of denouncing 
the capitalist machine, but what remains on the ground is a kind of themepark 
entertainment. The same occurs when Yinka Shonibare creates his Garden Of 
Love (2007) where he turns some well-known French 18th Century paintings into 
‘tableaux vivants’ and dresses the characters with batik cloth.5 He may have had the 
intention to both denounce the reality of slavery behind the happy amorous scenes 
of noble life and the false authenticity of African batik, which actually was made 
in Indonesia, but what remains is a wax-museum scene. More generally I would 
say that there is no straight connection between multimediality and subversion (or 
subjugation). A technical dispositif is always at the same time an aesthetic dispositif, 
and it is at this level that art may take on such and such political meaning, according 
to such and such a context.6 At the time of Appia, Mayakovsky or Artaud, stage-
setting borrowed forms of physical empowerment from lighting or music, from 
dance, gymnastics, sport, the circus or cinema, so that the theatre might get out of 
itself and become a form of existence for society itself.7 It is clear that today those 
additions have mostly become mere forms of intensification of the effect of theatrical 
performance. 
In cultural and artistic criticism, there has long been the view that to be critical 
meant demonstrating, for example, art’s complicity with globalisation, consumer 
spectacle, or, as you put it, art’s ‘fatal capture by discourse’. Do you see your work 
as a supplement to such analysis – by which we mean that you don’t dismiss the 
force of such critiques outright, but simply find them too mechanistic? Or do you 
instead regard your work as an antidote to such analyses, with their tendency to 
presume that all activity is compromised in advance?
I am not willing to discharge the artists of their responsibility, but I think that this 
responsibility must be disconnected from the stereotypes of the critical discourse 
about the overwhelming power of the market and consumerism that makes them 
victims or accomplices of its fallacies. The denunciation of the mythologies of the 
commodity, the fallacies of consumer society and the empire of the spectacle that 
were supposed 40 years ago to ‘unmask’ the various machineries of domination so 
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as to provide the anti-capitalist fighters with new weapons have turned into exactly 
the contrary: a nihilist wisdom of the reign of the commodity and the spectacle, of 
the equivalence of anything with anything, of anything with its image, and of the 
lie of any image. That nihilist wisdom pictures the law of domination as a force 
that permeates any will to do anything against it. Any protest is a performance, 
any performance is a spectacle, any spectacle is a commodity, such is the 
grounding thesis of this post-Marxist and post-Situationist wisdom. In such a way 
responsibility is overturned into incapacity. 
This is my point: the tradition of emancipation, which means the recognition of 
the capacity of everybody, has been contaminated in the critical tradition by views 
about the empire of the commodity and the incapacity to resist it that actually were 
born of a very different situation: that is, 19th Century bourgeois anxiety regarding 
the effects of popular access to new forms of consumption, fostering the capacity of 
anybody to reframe their lived world. That anxiety took on the form of a paternal 
concern with the danger threatening those poor people whose fragile brains were 
unable to grapple with that multiplicity. In other words, capacity was turned into 
impotence. 
This paternal concern – and the presupposition of ‘incapacity’ that it entailed 
– were generously endorsed in turn by those who wanted to help those poor people 
to become aware of their true condition, forgotten and disguised by the enticements 
and lies of the image or the regime of the spectacle. They endorsed it because critical 
procedures are about healing the disabled, healing those who are unable to see, 
unable to understand the meaning of what they see, unable to shift from knowledge 
to action. The problem is that the doctors need the disabled; they need to reproduce 
the disabilities that they heal. And the prosecutors need the culprits in order to 
sustain their prosecution. What I tried to do is to set aside this patronising position 
in order to bring out the potential of new capacities involved in phenomena of 
cultural appropriation and negotiation between conflicting forces.
Leaving aside these critiques of art, your approach also runs counter to the 
argument put forward in some sectors of art history, which is concerned to 
preserve aesthetic judgment by linking it to the question of medium. Very 
broadly, their argument is that if you abandon medium you abandon aesthetic 
judgment. Given your work is involved in reviving the critical potential of 
the aesthetic, how would you respond to this assertion which links aesthetic 
judgment to the question of the specificity of the medium?
I find no theoretical or historical connection between ‘aesthetic judgment’ and 
the specificity of the medium. An aesthetic judgment, as Kant states, means the 
judgment on a form, disconnected from the knowledge of its mode of fabrication. 
In a sense, aesthetics means the loss of a system of mediations. Mimesis meant the 
set of explicit and implicit rules that made the connection between the laws of the 
poiesis and the forms of the aisthesis. Aesthetics, on the contrary, means the absence 
of any rule of connection between the sensorium of artistic production and the 
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sensorium of aesthetic experience. On the one hand, this makes it dubious that 
something like a ‘medium’ may be the principle of aesthetic judgment. On the other 
hand, the ‘specificity of the medium’ was invoked as a way to plug the gap and 
to restore continuity between artistic production and aesthetic perception. But the 
notion of medium has nothing clear about it. Does it refer to material techniques 
and instruments? In this sense, it is clear that you don’t produce the same effect 
with a flute or a double bass, with watercolor, charcoal or acrylic. But, for all this, 
you have not yet defined the medium of music or painting. As it was used in the 
modernist quarrel, the concept of medium plays a double role. It ties up the plain 
idea of specific technical means with something quite different: the alleged essence 
of an art. In such a way, the truth to medium, conceived of as the inquiry about 
the possibilities given by a definite set of means was turned into its opposite: the 
idea of art as an end in itself opposed to the technical subjugation of a means to an 
end. The medium was identified as an end in itself. This means that the specificity 
of the medium became the mere metaphor of the identification between the self-
consciousness of an art and the assertion of the autonomy of art. When doubt was 
cast on that identification, the idea of medium-specificity was overturned again: the 
truth to medium became the obedience to the other, the absolute choice amounting 
to the absolute absence of choice. 
In the introduction to your book, The Politics Of Aesthetics, Gabriel Rockhill, 
asserts that you dismiss ‘discourses founded on the singularity of the other’ and 
instead show how ‘they are ultimately predicated on keeping the other in its 
Yinka Shonibare The Crowning 2007 (detail), mannequins, wax-printed cloth, coir matting, artificial flowers.
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place’.8 This seems a very limited way of thinking about singularity and the other. 
In his book on Clement Greenberg, for example, Thierry de Duve offers a reading 
of Greenberg’s approach to the issue of medium as other. What he means is that 
Greenberg views the medium as a ‘constraint’ – the artist must struggle with the 
medium and is never simply in command – which de Duve believes turns around 
heroic assumptions about the avant-garde, by considering the medium as ‘the 
address to an indeterminate other’.9 Do you have major objections to putting the 
issue of medium this way? What would these objections be?
The idea of the medium as the resistant other has to be traced back to its true origin: 
the Hegelian notion of symbolic art. It is Hegel who put the ‘resistance of matter’ at 
the centre of the analysis of art and conceived of it not as a mere imperfection, but 
as a gap inside the very practice and meaning of art – that is, the mark of an excess 
of the idea over its own representability. It is this excess which was conceptualised 
in the Adornian interpretation of ‘autonomy’ as resistance and inner contradiction. 
And it is this idea that was overturned in the Lyotardian idea of the sublime as the 
principle of modern art. In Lyotard’s analysis there is a significant shift from the 
idea of the resistance of matter to the statement of a religious figure of the Other. 
Look at his text ‘After The Sublime, The State Of Aesthetics’, in which he states 
that the sublime is the principle of modern art.10 This appears to mean first of all 
that modern art is true to the alterity of the materials. As he states it, its task is to 
‘approach’ matter in its alterity without having recourse to representation. In such a 
way he emphasises its commitment to the unique quality of a tone or a nuance, the 
grain of a skin or fragrance of an aroma. But soon he makes all those singularities 
interchangeable because ‘they all designate the event of a passion, a possibility for 
which the mind will not have been prepared, which will have unsettled it and of 
which it conserves only the feeling – anguish and jubilation – of an obscure debt.’11 
In such a way the commitment to matter becomes the mere sign of the dependence 
on a radical alterity. That alterity is first brought up as the shock of the aistheton or 
the ‘enslavement’ to the aistheton, as he puts it.12 But this enslavement to the aistheton 
ultimately becomes the ethical ‘debt’ to an absolute Other: this means ultimately that 
the task of art is to inscribe a shock which means the dependence of the mind on 
the law of the Other – be it the Lacanian ‘thing’ or the God of Moses. I think that De 
Duve’s analysis of Greenberg is in keeping with Lyotard’s idea of the ‘debt’, which 
means that it is in keeping with the shift that turned the ‘modernist’ commitment to 
the medium into the neo-religious commitment to the law of the Other. 
In a number of your publications you propose that the maxim of equality central 
to the aesthetic regime of art is played out in terms of the identity of opposites. 
Here, normally opposed categories, such as form and matter, consciousness and 
the unconscious, the intentional and the involuntary, and art and non-art are 
brought into a relation of equality rather than one of hierarchical division. Can 
you speak to the political implications of this relational equivalence between 
oppositional categories? 
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I did not want to establish a mechanistic equation, such as: aesthetic equality = 
identity of opposites. What I meant is that the aesthetic regime of art implied a 
redistribution with respect to the former distributions of territories and hierarchies. 
When Schiller set out to give a political meaning to the Kantian conception of 
form, he emphasised that it dismissed the old hierarchy of matter and form or 
understanding and sensibility. Obviously that hierarchy was in keeping with 
a whole political, social and ideological order that was structured around the 
opposition of activity and passivity in which ‘activity’ remained the privilege of the 
princes and the higher classes, while ‘passivity’ remained the lot of those who were 
entrapped in the necessity of productive and reproductive life. In this case, you can 
speak of an ‘identity of opposites’, but what occurs is much more like a suspension: 
the perception of form is no longer dependent on a form-matter model in keeping 
with a social hierarchy. The same happens with the dismissal of the division of 
genres, since that division was based on ‘social’ distinctions, namely on the ‘dignity’ 
of the subjects represented by art. When 19th Century artists, writers or critics 
asserted that all subjects were equivalent, it was still a question of asserting a form 
of aesthetic equality, but it could not be described as an ‘identity of the opposites’. 
As for the art/non-art separation, it is an interesting case, because it is not a question 
of making opposites identical. It is a question of framing a new opposition, the 
status of which is very different from the former one. The ‘art/non-art’ distinction 
had no place in the representational order. In that order, what was relevant was the 
opposition between fine arts – or liberal arts – and mechanical arts, which meant 
an opposition between arts designed for the pleasure and glorification of gentle 
people and arts designed to respond to the necessities of practical life. There was 
a clear principle of distinction and, correspondingly, a set of rules proper to the 
dignity of each art. The aesthetic regime substituted for this hierarchy, the separation 
between art and non-art, which is an indeterminate one. It functions as a norm, but 
as an equivocal one. On the one hand, art must be separated from the net of social 
relations; on the other hand, it is viewed as the construction of new forms of life. 
Moreover, there are no clear borders between art and non-art: art is turned to kitsch; 
or, on the contrary, disused commodities enter the realm of art. So it is not so much 
an ‘identity of the opposites’ as it is a redistribution of territories and borders. 
An impressive feature of your writings on aesthetics is your attentiveness to 
empirical developments in the various arts you have addressed. This differs from 
the way some philosophers dip a toe into art history, without much concern for 
the historical or formal specifics of art practices. At the same time, people like us, 
who work in art history, criticism and curating regularly introduce philosophical 
material into our writings on art. But, this too can have its problems. For 
example, the anti-aesthetic postmodernism that took hold in the U.S. in the 1980s 
announced that Kant’s aesthetic philosophy was irrelevant to contemporary 
art. But such claims were usually based on cursory readings or even third hand 
accounts of Kant’s philosophy. What is your feeling about these issues, because 
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in some respects they point to the perils of overriding disciplinary boundaries too 
cavalierly? Could you talk about how you approach the different disciplines that 
your work traverses?
In my view, the danger is not that of overriding boundaries. It is not a matter of 
boundaries. It is a matter of work and patience. Everybody is entitled to read Kant 
and make use of him, even if they have no ‘philosophical training’. Reading Kant 
happens to be a good philosophical training in itself. And, in order to understand 
what is at stake in Kant, you have to override the boundaries of the history of 
philosophy. You have to look at various events and debates that occurred at the 
same time – discussions about the salons, the invention of the art museum (notably 
in a revolutionary context), the constitution of art history – and you have to make 
his theses resonate in different historical and social contexts. As for me, I understood 
what was at stake in Kant’s idea of the aesthetic judgment as ‘disinterested’ in the 
wake of my research on workers’ emancipation in 19th Century France. It would 
appear that this has ‘nothing to do’ with aesthetics. Yet it appeared to me that 
workers’ emancipation meant for them the possibility of acquiring the capacity of 
a ‘disinterested’ gaze, the capacity of breaking away from the forms of perception 
and judgment that were supposed to ‘fit’ the ethos of the handworker. I could 
understand Kant’s aesthetics from the point of view of workers’ emancipation and 
workers’ emancipation from the point of view of Kant’s aesthetics. Of course, when 
I was doing this, historians thought that I was doing mere philosophical speculation 
and philosophers that I was doing mere empirical research. For me, it does not 
matter how you are classified. What matters is what new lines you are able to trace 
between separate objects and fields: art and theory are about this framing of new 
landscapes of the perceptible and the thinkable. So the peril is not that art critics, 
historians or curators read Kant in their own way. The point is that usually they 
don’t read Kant, they just borrow readymade interpretations of Kant – or any other 
philosopher – that one of their colleagues has already borrowed from an ‘authorised’ 
commentary on Kant made by a philosopher who read it through the interpretation 
of Derrida, Lyotard or others. The point is that when you refuse to override the 
frontiers, you then have to trust people who have arranged the materials for you. 
Yet, if you make the decision to use your own eyes and brains, you will never know 
how much time it will take, nor where it will lead you. 
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